Right-wing Populist Politics of History for Destabilising Democratic Systems | Summary of the Essay by Valentin Loos in Historia Prima, 2. 2025

This post was automatically translated from the German original at
Rechtspopulistische Geschichtspolitik zur Destabilisierung demokratischer Systeme | Kurzfassung des Aufsatzes von Valentin Loos in Historia Prima, 2. 2025.

This article is an abridged version of an essay in the second issue of Historia Prima, which appeared in May 2025 under the title “‘What we are experiencing here is 1933 on a global level, that is, the total seizure of power.’ The Functionalisation of History as Political Argument Using the Example of Corona Protests from 2020 to 2022“. The academic magazine, published annually under the direction of the Institute of History at the University of Hildesheim, aims to make outstanding student work accessible to the interested public following a peer-review process and close editorial revision. Historia Prima is published with open access and is available free of charge at this link. Submissions for the third issue of the magazine will be accepted between August and October 2025.

Even after the expiry of the last Corona protection measures and the accompanying official end of the pandemic at the beginning of 2023, public discussions about the proper handling of the virus continue to this day.¹ Political reappraisal has meanwhile made little progress despite repeatedly expressed declarations of interest: some federal states are still at the beginning of their endeavours, while others have at least announced initial, preliminary results. In Thuringia, for example, there is currently discussion about which experts should testify in the hearings before the investigative committee scheduled for August.² Berlin and Saxony-Anhalt, meanwhile, have presented commission reports that criticise, among other things, the handling of the dying, poor forms of communication, or inadequate preparation by the respective state governments.³

Corona Reappraisal as a Service to Democracy

At the federal level, the reappraisal of the pandemic is in an even worse state, even though the parties of the Merz government state in their coalition agreement that they want to “comprehensively reappraise the Corona pandemic within the framework of a commission of inquiry”, “particularly to derive lessons for future pandemic events”⁴. Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier recently emphasised how important it is to initiate a reappraisal of the pandemic and the social-political handling of it not only at the state level, but also at the federal level. According to him, the Corona pandemic was

“an enormous burden for a democracy. To discuss, to engage, to criticise, to protest, all of this was not or hardly possible during this time. And therefore our democracy lacked something quite essential: the permanent conversation of society with itself. A conversation that it so urgently needs, on which democracy depends.”⁵

In his speech, Steinmeier emphasises that it is “essential that transparency is established so that we can win back as many people as possible who doubted democracy during the pandemic, and that reappraisal is also an opportunity to regain trust.”⁶ With regard to the strengthening of the political fringes in the recent state and federal elections, the Federal President warned urgently: “If we do not reappraise, too much remains that has been suppressed. And what we do not address openly nourishes new conspiracy theories and new mistrust. Both are poison for democracy. Both play into the hands of populists, and we must not allow that.”⁷ Unlike the Merz government, Steinmeier sees in Corona reappraisal not merely the potential for improved preparation for similarly situated crisis situations in the future, but also a service to democracy itself.

How important this second dimension of reappraisal is can be clearly explained by examining the activities of declared opponents of the protective measures taken during the pandemic. The so-called ‘Corona deniers’ gathered for the first time for larger protest actions in Berlin in response to the first lockdown in March 2020. Similar protest groups quickly emerged in other German cities, which were able to gather more and more people behind them over time. Among them, the group ‘Querdenken’ [Lateral Thinking] stood out in particular, which rapidly formed into a collective movement in which supporters of different interests came together.⁸ This extremely heterogeneous group in party-political terms is united primarily by “the perceived unjustified restriction of fundamental rights, as well as alienation from representative democracy, deep mistrust of political institutions and openness to conspiracy theories.”⁹ The Constance political scientist Sebastian Kroos recognises in the group’s activities a new form of populism that unites left- and right-wing extremist positions to achieve a rejection of established orientation patterns.¹⁰ Through changed organisational forms – larger demonstration marches like the one on 29 August 2020 with about 40,000 supporters were no longer possible due to the protective regulations in force during the first Corona year, so the movement switched to decentralised spontaneous rallies, so-called ‘walks’ – (new) right-wing populist actors became increasingly dominant in shaping the protests. As a result, the demonstrations increasingly exhibited anti-democratic and state-subversive tendencies both in content and rhetoric.¹¹

COMPACT magazine as “mouthpiece and high-reach platform of the so-called New Right”¹² played a central role in spreading these ideologies. The online magazine, classified as demonstrably right-wing extremist by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and subsequently banned, sympathised with the Corona deniers from the beginning of the pandemic and even dedicated an entire issue to them in September 2020, in which they are romanticised as a freedom movement.¹³ The analysis of several issues of the magazine from 2020 to 2022 shows that Corona deniers repeatedly used historical analogies to argumentatively secure their criticism. Through the targeted use of such references to the past, they call into question seemingly socially secured patterns of interpretation and orientation and openly attack individual scientists as well as political institutions.

Historical memory, as historical research has repeatedly pointed out, plays a crucial role in the functionalisation of history as a political argument. The historian of theory Jörn Rüsen speaks in this context of a “political legitimation function”¹⁴. This contribution expands the circle of actors examined in previous research to include journalists and activists from the Corona protests. In doing so, it follows a methodologically sound approach derived from current contributions to the study of history politics and demonstrates the use of three central narratives.

I. Delegitimisation of state institutions

In view of increased use of the term ‘Corona dictatorship’ and the accompanying attempts to discredit protective measures taken, the language-critical jury chose the term as the non-word of the year 2020. Indeed, a rapid spread of the term among Corona deniers can be observed since its first mention in the April issue of COMPACT magazine in the same year.¹⁵ The term also appears in contributions by various speakers at Corona protests. Markus Haintz, former lecturer at Biberach University of Applied Sciences and Querdenken activist, reminded his audience in his speech on 1 August 2020 of how “[o]n 17 June 1953 […] the population of the GDR rose up against state arbitrariness, against tyranny and oppression”, only to subsequently declare that

“[e]ven though no tanks are rolling today, […] we in Germany and in many other countries of the world have nevertheless reached a point where the state, without any viable justification, arbitrarily and disproportionately, and with the aid of massive media fear and panic propaganda from state-loyal mass media, is implementing an agenda that massively endangers democracy and the rule of law, has effectively suspended fundamental rights and tramples on human rights and human dignity.”¹⁶

By equating the pandemic situation prevailing at that time, characterised by uncertainties, with the months before the uprisings of 17 June 1953, Haintz creates a historical orientation service in Jörn Rüsen’s sense¹⁷, which serves as a response to the experience of contingency provoked by the Corona protective measures taken. Haintz stylises the federal government as a form of rule similar to the GDR leadership in its oppressive manner, whilst the demonstrators present are propagated by him as rebellious folk heroes. Haintz’s argument can be understood as a critical-exemplary narrative in which “general laws of human life order” are generated through the historical facts of the 1953 uprisings, which are “applied to concrete cases of current contemporary events”¹⁸ and contradict the established interpretation of those events. At the time of the speech, however, assemblies and demonstrations were not fundamentally prohibited; rather, they were allowed to continue under certain conditions, so that Haintz’s orientation service is not empirically sound. Accordingly, we must speak here of a counterfactual critical-exemplary meaning-making that serves to establish alternative interpretive patterns and lend them legitimacy.

Similar patterns of argumentation can also be found in the later course of the protests. In particular, the third amendment to the Infection Protection Act in November 2020 can be understood as a catalyst for further linguistic transgression. In addition to analogies to GDR history, references to Nazi rule can also be observed.¹⁹ Thus, the Infection Protection Act is frequently equated linguistically and pictorially with the so-called ‘Law to Remedy the Distress of People and State’ of 24 March 1933. According to Rüsen, this narrative can also be evaluated as critical-exemplary meaning-making, since the individual event, here the National Socialist establishment of power in 1933 through the introduction of the Decree for the Protection of People and State, is assigned exemplary universal validity.²⁰ It is suggested that the revised Infection Protection Act and the associated legal basis for determining an epidemic situation of national significance would break up the democratic separation of powers and pave the way to dictatorship. Like Haintz’s argument, however, this analogy lacks empirical plausibility, since the revision of the Infection Protection Act by no means meant a disempowerment of the Bundestag, which retained the sole right to determine and lift the epidemic situation as such.²¹ A concentration of power in the then federal government cannot therefore be spoken of, so that the deconstruction again reveals a counterfactual critical-exemplary meaning-making.

These examples reveal a strategic use of historical memory by activists and participants in Corona protests: through blanket analogies to the Nazi or GDR regime, the current federal and state governments are propagated as ideologically succeeding dictatorships. Corona deniers thus use their counterfactual critical-exemplary arguments to delegitimise state institutions.

II. Victimisation as a community-building element

Building on the narrative of an alleged dictatorship, Corona deniers create, in a second step using history as a political argument, the image of an oppressed population, of which they declare themselves representatives.²² For this purpose, they take up the historically charged slogan ‘We are the people’, which was coined by demonstrators at the Monday demonstrations in 1989 and has since been interpreted in Germany as an epitome of civil resistance activities against authoritarian systems. By using this slogan, the associated historical facts are recalled, thus creating an orientation offer that directly builds on the dictatorship narrative, but now focuses more on the demonstrators themselves, who imagine themselves as victims of an oppressive regime. The meaning-making occurs in the mode of critical-traditional narration, in which the federal government is portrayed as the spiritual-ideological successor institution to the GDR leadership. Here too, however, we must speak of a counterfactual critical-traditional narrative, since although the number of those participating in the Corona protests steadily increased, it never reached the extent that one could speak of a majority representing the people.²³

The victimisation achieved through such meaning-making represents the second central narrative of Corona deniers and is a popular argumentative strategy at demonstrations. A speech contribution by a young woman in mid-November 2020 at a Querdenken demonstration in Hannover caused great media attention. Because she, according to her narrative, had actively resisted for months by giving speeches, demonstrating, distributing flyers and organising rallies, she felt like Sophie Scholl.²⁴ Through the comparison with Sophie Scholl, the woman staged herself as a victim of an allegedly dictatorial regime. The meaning-making also proceeds here in the mode of critical-exemplary narration, but must be evaluated as an inappropriate argument due to its generalising tendency. With her non-sound statement, the speaker undermined Sophie Scholl’s resistance efforts and ultimately relativised the danger of the National Socialist dictatorship.

The victim narrative thus allows us to observe another form of functionalisation of history by COVID deniers, which serves victimisation and, through its juxtaposition with the dictatorship narrative, prepares the ground for motivation-generating narratives. Through their argumentation, they pursue the goal of opposing the allegedly corrupt – or, in the view of COVID deniers, dictatorial – elite with a morally superior entity.²⁵ In this context, Yildirim speaks of populists who stage themselves as the “mouthpiece of an imagined culturally and ethnically homogeneous people”.²⁶

III. Mobilisation of ‘Resistance’

While the historical narratives anchored in the dictatorship and victim narratives provide orientation through the populist juxtaposition of ‘Them’ – in the sense of a state delegitimised as a dictatorship – and an ‘Us’ – staged as a victim oppressed by COVID protection measures – the resistance narrative serves primarily to mobilise supporters within the group of COVID deniers against what is perceived as unjustified action by federal and state governments.

This can be observed, for example, in an interview with the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, who compared the introduction of the first lockdown in March 2020 with the establishment of power by the National Socialists in 1933, before stating that “new forms of resistance are necessary for those who do not give up thinking towards a future politics that has neither the form of bourgeois democracies nor the form of bio-hygienic arbitrary rule that currently takes their place”.²⁷ While Agamben remained comparatively vague in his appeal, the former WDR journalist and conspiracy theorist Gerhard Wisnewski spoke of “1933 on a global level”²⁸ and prophesied: “In view of this, there is only one choice: uprising or gulag”.²⁹ This clearly shows how strongly the three narratives used by COVID deniers are interconnected, as Agamben and Wisnewski only generate a motivational recommendation for action by activating the dictatorship narrative and its accompanying orientation function. Since emotions play a crucial role in transforming historical orientation into practical actions, such a constructed threat scenario is indispensable for the functioning of the resistance narrative.³⁰

That the generated motivation among COVID deniers took effect despite or precisely because of its counterfactual basis was evident not only in the steadily increasing numbers of participants at demonstrations in 2020 or the accumulation of antisemitic incidents even outside the events,³¹ but can also be observed in increased aggressive behaviour towards journalists and protesting outside the houses and apartments of politicians.³² However, the movement achieved the peak of its ‘resistance’ in August 2020, when several hundred people equipped with Reich flags occupied the steps of the Reichstag following the American model.³³ This incident illustrates the democracy-threatening potential of the COVID protests, as they contributed significantly to “blurring boundaries between legitimate democratic political protest and far-right populist positions”.³⁴

The functionalisation of the resistance narrative can be repeatedly recognised in the speeches of individual participants at the previously held rallies, in which various historical figures are heroised as resistance fighters and declared role models for the movement. Besides the previously mentioned comparison of the speaker with Sophie Scholl, this can be seen, for example, in Samuel Eckert’s speech, which is oriented towards Martin Luther as a leading figure:

“He went to the Diet of Worms and stood before the whole nation and said: Here I stand. I can do no other. […] 500 years later we are in the same situation, where we must ask ourselves how far we want to go for the truth”.³⁵

What is particularly striking about Eckert’s critical-exemplary meaning-making is above all his appropriation of an alleged truth, because “[i]n this way, right-wing populists stage themselves as owners of absolute truths and as the only ones willing to share them with the people”.³⁶ The comparison lacks any empirical plausibility, as the demonstrators, unlike Luther, have not been declared outlaws and thus without rights, which makes the appropriation of absolute truth seem all the more ironic. Through the appeal to a sole, absolute truth, Eckert’s argumentation reaches a new qualitative level compared to the previously analysed patterns of argumentation: unlike before, one can no longer merely assume counterfactuality; rather, alleged knowledge is elevated to a universally valid truth and any significance is denied to possible counter-arguments.

Overall, COVID deniers thus succeed in establishing a resistance narrative with reference to the dictatorship and victim narratives in their interpretive handling of history, in which they are heroised as champions of democratic fundamental values. As in the previous narratives, however, the historical cognitive achievements made for functionalisation are not plausible. Nevertheless, this counterfactual “counter-history […] is perceived in emotionalised perception as critical historical interpretation”³⁷ and thus as truth.

Politics of History for Destabilising Democratic Systems

The described narratives, considered individually, each pursue different motives – namely those of delegitimising state institutions, victimising their own supporters, and mobilising those very supporters – but only unfold their full power of impact in interaction. In the dictatorship narrative, comparisons between the Federal Republic and the Nazi dictatorship or GDR leadership are repeatedly constructed in order to delegitimise the former as an illegitimate state. At the same time, this government perceived as illegitimate is opposed through the victim narrative by a völkisch-nationalist construct of ‘Us’ that unites racist and antisemitic attributions of belonging and non-belonging. Finally, the resistance narrative is intended to evoke a motivation for action among supporters that is directed against the ‘Them’ perceived as oppressive. By staging themselves as victims of an alleged morally corrupt COVID dictatorship, they thus seek support for their subversive intentions. Through this blanket-polarising logic of thinking that propagates a “them-against-us” or “evil-against-good” worldview, their own group identity is legitimised, leading to a self-reinforcing demarcation from the outside. The social movement of COVID deniers thus increasingly becomes a socio-spatial echo chamber.³⁸

The actors utilize numerous orientation offerings, with the resistance narrative in particular intended to achieve action-guiding motivation. Historical meaning-making proceeds exclusively in the form of critical-traditional or critical-exemplary narratives. However, these meaning-making processes are built on falsehoods and imprecise analogies as well as conspiracy theories, which is why they run counter to empirical, theoretical and normative plausibility and must therefore be designated as counterfactual in deconstruction. Through populist argumentation strategies, they are elevated to the sole truth and set against established patterns of interpretation. Social consensus in memory culture is thus openly attacked.

Even in the expansion of the circle of actors, (right-wing) populist argumentation patterns thus remain recognizable. Corona deniers represent both an individual phenomenon closely interwoven with the pandemic events and an exemplum attributable to the circle of (right-wing) populism that deserves corresponding scientific attention. What remains open so far is the extent to which the argumentation patterns used can also be found in other discourses after the declared end of the pandemic. The deconstruction of such narratives will therefore continue to be a central task of historical-theoretical research in the future.

1. Cf. Bader, Nadine: Corona-Maßnahmen laufen aus. So endet die Pandemie, in: tagesschau, 07.04.2023, URL: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/corona-massnahmen-ende-101.html (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
2. Cf. Vogel, Elena: Streeck, Drosten und Co. Diese Virologen sollen beim Thüringer Corona-Ausschuss aussagen, in: Thüringer Allgemeine, 28.05.2025, URL: https://www.thueringer-allgemeine.de/politik/article409128542/streeck-drosten-und-co-diese-virologen-sollen-beim-thueringer-corona-ausschuss-aussagen.html (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
3. Cf. Salpius, Daniel: Pandemie-Kommission. Rechte Sterbender missachtet, in: mdr, 21.05.2025, URL: https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/sachsen-anhalt/corona-pandemie-kommission-bericht-104.html (accessed: 27.07.2025); Schwager, Christian: Corona-Aufarbeitung für Berlin. Schwarzbuch offenbart Diskrepanz zu Fakten, in: Berliner Morgenpost, 30.05.2025, URL: https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/mensch-metropole/corona-aufarbeitung-fuer-berlin-was-waren-die-fakten-und-was-wurde-erzaehlt-li.2328869 (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
4. Christian Democratic Union of Germany/ Christian Social Union in Bavaria/ Social Democratic Party of Germany: Verantwortung für Deutschland. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, in: koalitionsvertrag2025, 2025, p. 112, URL: https://www.koalitionsvertrag2025.de/ (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
5. Steinmeier, Frank-Walter: „Wir müssen die Zeit der Pandemie aufarbeiten”, in: Der Bundespräsident, 14.03.2025, URL: https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2025/03/250314-Corona-Aufarbeitung.html (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
6. Ibid. ︎
7. Ibid. ︎
8. Cf. Federal Association of Research and Information Centres on Antisemitism (RIAS): Antisemitismus im Kontext der Covid-19-Pandemie, Berlin: 2020, pp. 10, 24; Holzer, Boris et al.: Einleitung. Protest in der Pandemie, in: Sven Reichhardt (ed.): Die Misstrauensgemeinschaft der ‚Querdenker’. Die Corona-Proteste aus kultur- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Perspektive, Frankfurt am Main/New York: Routledge 2021, pp. 7–26, here p. 8. The formation of system-critical movements during the pandemic is a phenomenon that was not limited to Germany but could be observed worldwide. A first analysis of these internationally occurring processes is offered by Ringe, Nils/ Rennó, Lucio (eds.): Populists and the Pandemic. How Populists around the World Responded to COVID-19 (Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy), London/New York: Routledge 2023. ︎
9. Kroos, Sebastian: Konturen einer heterogenen ‚Misstrauensgemeinschaft’. Die soziale Zusammensetzung der Corona-Proteste und die Motive ihrer Teilnehmer:innen, in: Sven Reichardt (ed.): Die Misstrauensgemeinschaft der ‚Querdenker’. Die Corona-Proteste aus kultur- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Perspektive, Frankfurt am Main/New York: Routledge 2021, pp. 67–89, here p. 84. ︎
10. Cf. ibid., p. 85; Zajak, Sabrina: COVID-19 and the Reconfiguration of the Social Movement Landscape, in: Breno Bringel/ Geoffrey Pleyers (eds.): Social Movements and Politics during COVID-19. Crisis, Solidarity and Change in a Global Pandemic, Bristol: Bristol University Press 2022, pp. 134–140, here p. 138. Zajak sees a parallel to the US-American QAnon movement and emphasises: “[t]he broadness of the alliance structures is particularly dangerous as it facilitates the diffusion of racist and right-wing beliefs”. ︎
11. Cf. Holzer et al., Einleitung 2021, p. 13; Federal Association of Research and Information Centres on Antisemitism (RIAS): Antisemitische Vorfälle und Erscheinungsformen im Kontext der aktuellen Proteste gegen die Corona-Maßnahmen in Deutschland, Berlin: 2022, p. 2. ︎
12. Götschenberg, Michael: Verfassungsschutz zu ‚Compact’. „Gesichert extremistisch”, in: tagesschau, 10.12.2021, URL: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/compact-magazin-101.html, (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
13. Cf. Schilk, Felix: Der Zornunternehmer. Das COMPACT-Magazin als Scharnierbaustein im rechten Mosaik, in: kultuRRevolution. Zeitschrift für angewandte Diskurstheorie, 77. 2019, no. 2, pp. 32–44, here p. 40. ︎
14. Rüsen, Jörn: Geschichtskultur, Bildung und Identität. Über Grundlagen der Geschichtsdidaktik (Geschichtsdidaktik diskursiv, vol. 8), Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 2020, p. 20.
    Under the concept of Geschichtspolitik [politics of history], historical scholarship has been researching since the 1970s the functionalisation of history as a political argument, which can be understood as “a political argumentative structure within which a historical fact, a historical context or a historical interpretation is drawn upon to gain approval for a concrete political project and to solicit legitimacy for the same” (Becker, Manuel: Geschichte als Argument. Ein Stiefkind der neueren geschichtspolitischen Forschung, in: Claudia Fröhlich/ Harald Schmid/ Birgit Schwelling (eds.): 25 Jahre europäische Wende (Jahrbuch für Politik und Geschichte, vol. 5), Stuttgart: Steiner 2014, pp. 173–187, here p. 174). ︎
15. Janich, Nina: Pressemitteilung. Wahl des 30. „Unwort des Jahres” und eine neue Jury, in: Unwort des Jahres, 12.01.2021, URL: https://unwortdesjahres.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/pressemitteilung_unwort2020.pdf (accessed: 27.07.2025), pp. 1–2; Elsässer, Jürgen: Die Corona-Diktatur, in: COMPACT. Magazin für Souveränität, 4. 2020, p. 3. ︎
16. Haintz, Markus: „Das Wort Faschismus habe ich früher nicht verstanden”. Rede von Markus Haintz am 1. August (Straße des 17. Juni), in: COMPACT Edition. Magazin für Souveränität, 8. 2020, pp. 35–39, here p. 35. ︎
17. Cf. Rüsen, Jörn: Historik. Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft, Cologne: Böhlau 2013, p. 210. ︎
18. Ibid., p. 211. ︎
19. Cf. Kolhoff, Werner: Vergleich „Verordnung zum Schutz von Volk und Staat” – „Bevölkerungsschutzgesetz”, in: tageblatt, 24.11.2020, URL: https://www.tageblatt.lu/premium/jana-aus-kassel-hat-sich-nicht-vertan-warnung-vor-abdriften-der-corona-proteste/ (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
20. Cf. Rüsen, Historik 2013, pp. 210–211. ︎
21. Originally enacted as the Seuchenrechtsneuordnungsgesetz [Epidemic Law Reorganisation Act] in 2000, the law has been repeatedly amended over the years. With the renewed amendment in November 2020, the original text is tightened to the effect that the federal government must henceforth regularly account to the Bundestag for epidemiological developments. At the same time, the law clearly states that the Bundestag (and not the federal government) decides on the determination of an epidemiological emergency situation based on defined criteria. Cf. Federal Ministry of Justice: Gesetz zur Neuordnung seuchenrechtlicher Vorschriften (Seuchenrechtsneuordnungsgesetz – SeuchRNeuG), in: Bundesgesetzblatt, 33. 2000, pp. 1045–1077; Cf. Federal Ministry of Justice: Drittes Gesetz zum Schutz der Bevölkerung bei einer epidemischen Lage von nationaler Tragweite vom 18. November 2020, in: Bundesgesetzblatt, 52. 2020, pp. 2397–2413, here pp. 2397–2398. ︎
22. Similar argumentative patterns have already been identified by Müller, Jan-Werner: What Is Populism?, Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press 2016, pp. 19–20 and Yildirim, Lale: (Un-)Ehrliche Geschichte? Alternativfaktische kritisch-traditionale Erzählung als Instrument rechtspopulistischer Um-Deutung, in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtsdidaktik, 17. 2018, no. 1, pp. 57–71, here p. 60 as central components of right-wing populism. ︎
23. Cf. Fense, Marco/ Quadbeck, Eva: Corona-Proteste. Zahl der Demonstrierenden nimmt zu – auch viel Gegenprotest, in: rnd, 27.01.2022, URL: https://www.rnd.de/politik/corona-und-proteste-zahl-der-demonstrierenden-steigt-viel-gegenprotest-VIH4SW4VTZTUDA2KCIFENDQX24.html (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
24. Cf. WELT Nachrichtensender: „So ein Schwachsinn”. „QUERDENKEN”-Rednerin vergleicht sich mit Sophie Scholl, in: YouTube, 2020, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Y7pNU03i-o (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
25. Müller, Populism 2016, pp. 19–20. ︎
26. Yildirim, Geschichte 2018, p. 60. ︎
27. Lenz, Anselm / Sodenkamp, Hendrik: „Totalitärster Apparat der Geschichte”. Giorgio Agamben im Interview mit Anselm Lenz und Hendrik Sodenkamp, in: COMPACT Aktuell. Magazin für Souveränität, 4. 2020, pp. 22–23, here p. 23. ︎
28. Meissner, Karl: „Das ist ein globales 1933″. Gerhard Wisnewski im Gespräch mit Karl Meissner, in: COMPACT. Magazin für Souveränität, 1. 2022, pp. 14–16, here p. 14. ︎
29. Ibid., p. 16. ︎
30. Cf. Rüsen, Historik 2013, pp. 42–43. The symbiosis of the three narratives can also be clearly recognised in Ralph Niemeyer’s speech. Thus, with regard to the year 1989, he stated: “We stand thirty years later […] again at the same point and have in truth not progressed a single step. […] We must now complete what got stuck in 1989″ (Niemeyer, Ralph T.: „Endlich den Friedensvertrag verhandeln”. Rede von Ralph T. Niemeyer am 29. August (Siegessäule), in: COMPACT Edition. Magazin für Souveränität, 8. 2020, pp. 103–104, here p. 103). In the mode of critical-traditional meaning formation, Niemeyer offers listeners an orientation that suggests the population is being oppressed by the Corona protection measures taken by federal and state governments, thus encouraging mobilisation. ︎
31. Cf. Federal Association RIAS, Antisemitismus 2020, p. 8. ︎
32. Cf. Rafael, Simone: Gewalt und Coronaleugner*innen. Mit Schießkugelschreiber, Messer und Kleinkind auf die Demonstration, in: belltower, 19.01.2022, URL: https://www.belltower.news/gewalt-und-coronaleugnerinnen-mit-schiesskugelschreiber-messer-und-kleinkind-auf-die-demonstration-127101/ (accessed: 27.07.2025); Kormeier, Claudia: Verbot von Demos vor Politiker-Häusern rechtens?, in: tagesschau, 21.02.2022, URL: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/proteste-privathauser-versammlungsrecht-101.html (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
33. Cf. Philippsen, Kai T.: Vorfall bei Berliner Demo. Corona-Skeptiker stürmen durch Absperrung auf Treppe des Reichstags, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29.08.2020, URL: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/corona-skeptiker-stuermen-durch-absperrung-zum-reichstag-16928759.html (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
34. Cf. Vieten, Ulrike M.: The “New Normal” and “Pandemic Populism”. The COVID-19 Crisis and Anti-Hygienic Mobilisation of the Far-Right, in: Social Sciences, 9. 2020, URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/9/9/165 (accessed: 27.07.2025). ︎
35. Eckert, Samuel: „Hier stehe ich. Ich kann nicht anders”. Rede von Samuel Eckert am 2. August (Brandenburger Tor), in: COMPACT Edition. Magazin für Souveränität, 8. 2020, pp. 48–49, here p. 48. ︎
36. Yildirim, Geschichte 2018, p. 60. ︎
37. Ibid., p. 59. ︎
38. Cf. Rau, Jan P./ Stier, Sebastian: Die Echokammer-Hypothese. Fragmentierung der Öffentlichkeit und politische Polarisierung durch digitale Medien?, in: Zeitschrift für vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 13. 2019, no. 3, pp. 399–417. ︎